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A MARITIME SECURITY REGIME 
FOR NORTHEAST ASIA
Mark J. Valencia
The Six Party Talks can be the crucible for forging a regional
security mechanism in Northeast Asia. This mechanism should
originally focus on maritime security. The rationale includes the
region’s geography, competing maritime and island claims, the
resultant maritime military buildup and changing priorities,
increasing frequency of dangerous incidents, and the existence of
a foundation for conflict avoidance and resource sharing. The
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
could serve as a model for a similar Declaration for Northeast
Asian Seas that may ultimately include guidelines for activities in
others’ Exclusive Economic Zones.
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Conceptual and Practical Context
The Functional Approach to Conflict Resolution
The first step toward the peaceful settlement of conflict is the
creation of a sense of community.1 The creation of such a commu-
1. Mark J. Valencia, A Maritime Regime for Northeast Asia (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 10-11.
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nity presupposes at least the mitigation and minimization of con-
flict, so that shared interests and common needs outweigh the fac-
tors that separate the parties. A functional approach can help the
growth of positive and constructive common work and of com-
mon habits and interests, decreasing the significance of artificial
boundaries and barriers or the lack thereof by overlaying them
with a web of common activities and administrative agencies. The
challenge then for Northeast Asia is to develop a variety of
arrangements that will demonstrate that a habit of dialogue and
working together can build common—and eventually coopera-
tive—security. Tactical learning—in which behavior toward coop-
eration changes—must be replaced by complex learning in which
values and beliefs about reaching goals through cooperation
change. In this context, cooperation in the maritime spheres satis-
fies the conceptual criteria and can be a means of building confi-
dence, reducing tension, and eliminating points of conflict. It can
also have positive spillover effects on relations between nations.
With progress in the Six Party Talks (6PT) regarding the
Korea conundrum, analysts and politicians alike are again think-
ing and talking about a new security architecture for Northeast
Asia.2 At the 2006 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) Regional Forum meeting in Kuala Lumpur, U.S. Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice called for a “robust dialogue on
Northeast Asian security” that could help overcome historical ten-
sions, increase security, and create a “better basis for enhanced
prosperity throughout the region.”3 In February 2007, the parties
to the 6PT agreed to negotiate a “peace regime” in “an appropriate
separate forum.”4 In January 2008, Rice expressed her belief that
the Six Party Talks can be used for “larger purposes” such as
“forging a regional security mechanism.”5 New Australian Prime
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Minister Kevin Rudd is an enthusiastic supporter of the concept—
if it includes Australia.6
The general hope is that the process of managing transition
on the Korean peninsula can create new patterns of cooperation
and thus lay the foundation for a 21st century security architec-
ture in the region. However, some—perhaps many—in ASEAN
see the proposal as diluting the ASEAN Regional Forum’s posi-
tion as the only region-wide overarching security mechanism.7
Thus, starting “small and specific” in Northeast Asia might be
more politically palatable to all concerned. In this context, some
prominent analysts are urging Japan and the United States to
build international institutions initially focused on “concrete issues
such as resource sharing, environment and particular security
issues,” e.g., maritime conflict, that could gradually develop into
larger institutions.8
Inspiring Examples from Maritime Agreements
In building mutual security, there are several significant rea-
sons to focus initially on the maritime sphere. Much of Northeast
Asia is essentially maritime, encompassing peninsulas, archipela-
gos, disputed islands, strategic straits, and sea lanes. These fea-
tures surround and are embedded in a series of semi-enclosed
seas—the Sea of Japan (East Sea), the Yellow Sea, and the East
China Sea.
For many years these seas were dangerous frontiers and
Northeast Asian nations attempted to avoid escalating tension
with their neighbors by either refraining from extending their
maritime jurisdiction or foregoing provocative activities there.
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However, in the last two decades all coastal countries of Northeast
Asia have claimed 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZ) and continental shelves.9 This has resulted in a major
change in the maritime arena in which disputes between unfriend-
ly nations have seriously exacerbated relations between them.
The resultant maritime military buildup is another good rea-
son for a Northeast Asian security dialogue to focus initially on
the maritime sphere. Indeed, given the region’s geography and
the plethora of maritime boundary and territorial disputes stimu-
lated by this wave of extended maritime jurisdiction, it is not sur-
prising that maritime issues have risen to the forefront of regional
security concerns.10 Recent examples of serious maritime disputes
include the Japan-China wrangles over East China Sea bound-
aries, and potential gas in their disputed area; Japan-China claims
to sovereignty over the Senkaku or Diaoytai islands, the Japan-
South Korea dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo and fish; the Japan-
Russia dispute over the Northern Territories (Southern Kuriles)
and their maritime resources; and the North-South Korea dispute
over their western maritime boundary and valuable crabs. There
are other similar disputes that may soon surface. Maritime North-
east Asia has thus become an increasingly dangerous milieu
where the building of trust and confidence is sorely needed.
The increasing prominence of these and other issues, such
as spying and illegal maritime activities, including piracy and
potential “terrorism,” dictates broader responsibilities and
changing priorities for military force structure, operations, and
training. Together with the requirements of self-reliance and
force modernization, these concerns are reflected in the signifi-
cant maritime dimension of current arms acquisition programs.11
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This includes maritime surveillance and intelligence collection
systems, multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack capabili-
ties, modern surface combatants, submarines,12 anti-ship mis-
siles, naval electronic warfare systems, mine warfare capabilities,
and now missile defense systems. Because some of these new
systems are perceived to have offensive capabilities, they are
seen as provocative, and thus destabilizing, particularly by those
countries that do not have them and lack the means to acquire
them. Moreover, possession of these systems undoubtedly
increases the risk of inadvertent escalation in time of conflict.
A third reason is that there are already precedents and even
an incipient foundation on which a regional maritime security
regime can be built. Indeed these nations have quite pro-actively
constructed a web of conflict avoidance mechanisms. Some are
of direct security significance, such as incidents-at-sea agree-
ments between the United States and Russia (1972),13 Russia and
South Korea (1994),14 and Russia and Japan (1993);15 a maritime
consultative agreement between the United States and China
(1998);16 and a North-South Korea agreement to prevent acci-
dental naval clashes in the West Sea.17 These military-to-military
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agreements have varying degrees of effectiveness and most are
U.S. influenced. Nevertheless, they all aim to avoid unintended
conflict during naval and air operations.
Perhaps the most successful multilateral maritime effort in
Northeast Asia is the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF).18
Most important, it includes all of the states engaged in the 6PT
except North Korea.
A web of bilateral confidence-building measures already
exists.19 Japan and China and Japan and South Korea are exchang-
ing military officers at their respective national defense universi-
ties. In 2008, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (SDF) hosted each other’s
ship visits. As well, Japan and South Korea have cooperated in
maritime search and rescue operations.
All Northeast Asian states except North Korea have ratified
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.20 The convention
provides a general framework and some specific confidence- and
security-building measures. For example, some agreements in
the region already implement the convention stipulation that
pending agreement on EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, the
parties concerned shall enter into “provisional arrangements of a
practical nature” for management of resources in areas of over-
lapping claims.21 Such provisional arrangements in Northeast
Asia include agreements between China and Japan, China and
South Korea, and Japan and South Korea to share fish stocks in
their respective disputed areas.22 North and South Korea are dis-
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cussing a similar temporary solution to their imbroglio in the
Yellow Sea.23 More significant, Japan and South Korea have been
undertaking joint development of hydrocarbons in their area of
overlapping continental shelf claims in the northern East China
Sea for nearly thirty years.24 Japan and China have also agreed in
principle to do the same in the central East China Sea.25 Even
more remarkable, in December 2005, North Korea and China
forged a similar arrangement in West Korea Bay.26
After several serious incidents, Japan and China established
a mutual “prior notification” regime for scientific research in
their disputed area in the East China Sea.27 Moreover, such
“courtesy” or expectation has been proposed and is being dis-
cussed by Japan and South Korea for their disputed area in the
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Sea of Japan (East Sea).28 Perhaps more important is that North
Korea’s tentative first steps toward rapprochement with the
South included agreements on passage of its ships through
South Korean waters29 and a joint commercial fisheries venture.
And since 2004, the United Nations Environmental Program’s
Northwest Pacific Action Plan has had in place an oil spill con-
tingency arrangement, which was activated in December 2007 to
deal with a massive oil spill off the coast of South Korea.30
Thus, emerging from one of the most conflict-prone regions
of the world is a conflict avoidance regime—in short, an expec-
tation of self-restraint and sharing of resources in disputed
areas. This is the core around which can be created a maritime
confidence- and security-building architecture. Most of the
above regimes are not multilateral, nor have they evolved in
that direction despite the hopes and recommendations of policy
analysts and practitioners. However, they can be expanded and
have a spillover effect on relations in general and creation of a
maritime security regime in particular.
Indeed, given this network of arrangements, a multilateral
agreement or declaration31 on a “code of conduct” for Northeast
Asian seas would be a natural next step. Outside powers active
in the maritime region might be expected to adhere or even
accede to relevant elements of the declaration. In an optimistic
scenario, Taiwan might also unilaterally adhere to the declara-
tion (as it did to the ASEAN-China Declaration on Conduct in
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the South China Sea32), helping to reduce the mounting tension
in the Taiwan Strait.33
A Code of Conduct: Need and Basis
The Danger
What sorts of disputes or activities present a danger for con-
frontation and conflict, and thus need to be addressed? The list is
long and varied but in summary includes disputes over islands
and maritime boundaries and the oil and gas and fisheries in the
disputed areas; responsibility for environmental pollution; non-
consensual marine scientific research in other’s claimed waters;
marine and aerial “spy” probes and other foreign military activi-
ties in claimed EEZs; and freedom of navigation in straits.
The following is a sampling of recent serious maritime inci-
dents in rough ascending order of conflict potential:34
• In November 2007, it was announced that South Korea had
found large-scale gas hydrate deposits in the Ulleung Basin in
the East Sea.35 Such deposits are considered highly desirable
now due to soaring crude oil prices and growing concerns over
climate change.36
• On December 7, 2007, the oil tanker Hebei Spirit collided with a
barge 100 kilometers south of Seoul, releasing some 2.7 million
gallons of crude oil into the sea. The oil seriously impacted 160
kilometers of South Korea’s coastline, including its wildlife and
aquaculture farms there.37 Russia continues to seize Japanese
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fishing boats allegedly fishing illegally in Russian waters near
the disputed Southern Kurile Islands (Northern Territories).38
• In 2001, three-way disputes over South Korean fishing around
the Russian-controlled Southern Kurile Islands/Northern Terri-
tories brought South Korea-Japan relations to a boiling point.39
Domestic politics reared its ugly head and confrontation became
probable—between fisheries vessels from both countries or even
between their patrol vessels.
• The Senkakus/Diaoyutai controversy in the East China Sea sur-
faces quite often and has led to confrontations between Japanese
Maritime Enforcement Agency vessels and Chinese protestors
from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.40 Japan and South Korea
have exchanged threats regarding Japan’s intent to survey the
disputed area around Dokdo/Takeshima island in the East Sea/
Sea of Japan.41 Other disputes remain just below the surface.42
• Chinese intelligence gathering vessels frequent the Japanese
EEZ.43 Japan considers these forays provocative and even threat-
ening. Particularly galling was the discovery of a Chinese subma-
rine inside Japan’s territorial waters. The same applies to Chinese
“marine scientific research” in Japan’s claimed EEZ.
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• China dispatched PLA Navy warships to protect its offshore
drilling rigs in the East China Sea from any possible Japanese
interference.44
• In April 2001, China demanded that three Australian warships
leave China’s territorial waters in the Taiwan Strait because they
were allegedly violating the innocent passage regime.45
• In December 2007, China expressed “grave concern” to the Unit-
ed States because the U.S. Kitty Hawk carrier group transited the
Taiwan Strait after being banned by Beijing from visiting Hong
Kong.46 Some reports claimed that a Chinese destroyer and an
attack submarine “shadowed” the U.S. carrier group and brought
it to a battle-ready status.47 During the March 2008 election in
Taiwan, the Kitty Hawk and its strike group were deployed near
the Taiwan Strait.48
• In September 2007, Chinese Hong-6 bombers conducted military
movements in the East China Sea within Taiwan and Japan’s Air
Defense Identification Zones and Japanese F4 fighter jets were
scrambled to the area.49
• In February 2008, a Russian Tupolev 95 bomber violated Japanese
airspace over the Izu island chain and was warned off by scram-
bled Japanese fighter jets.50
• On March 2008, a Russian reconnaissance aircraft approached a
U.S. carrier in the East Sea/Sea of Japan and was escorted out of
the ROK’s air defense safety zone by two U.S. F/A-18 fighters
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from the carrier supported by four ROK air force F-16 fighters.51
• The U.S. Navy survey vessel Bowditch—backed by an Aegis
destroyer—continues to gather data from the Chinese EEZ in the
Yellow and East China Seas despite confrontations and threats
from Chinese frigates and aircraft.52
• In November 2007, a Chinese submarine surfaced in the middle
of a U.S. Navy exercise in the East China Sea, surprising and
embarrassing the U.S. ships.53 In April 2001, a collision between
a U.S. surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet over China’s
EEZ in the South China Sea chilled relations between the two
powers.54 The surveillance flights are based in Okinawa and
include the east coast of China; they are ongoing.
• In December 2001, Japanese Maritime Enforcement Agency ves-
sels attacked and sank a North Korean spy vessel in its and
China’s claimed EEZ.55
• In June 2002, a major naval clash broke out between South Korean
and North Korean naval patrol boats in their disputed Western
border area.56 Another clash occurred in June 2003.57 Analysts
were predicting further clashes in April 2008.58
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The specifics of the “declaration” would be drawn from pre-
vious bilateral agreements, involving one or more countries in
the region. They include agreement on incidents at sea, fisheries,
prior notification, joint development, search and rescue, and
environmental protection.59 The following is a draft declaration
of conduct of parties in Northeast Asian waters.60
A Proposed Declaration
DECLARATION ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES IN NORTHEAST ASIAN
WATERS
The Governments of the People’s Republic of China, the Democra-
tic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Russia.
REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop
the friendship and cooperation existing between their people and
governments with the view of promoting a 21st century-oriented
partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust;
COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly, and
harmonious environment in Northeast Asian waters for the
enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth, and prosperity
in the region;
DESIRING to enhance favorable conditions for a peaceful and
durable solution of differences and disputes among countries con-
cerned;
HEREBY DECLARE the following:
1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and
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principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of
international law which shall serve as the basic norms govern-
ing state-to-state relations;
2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust
and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned prin-
ciples and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;
3. Nothing contained in the Declaration or activities taking place
pursuant to it should be interpreted as prejudicing the position
of any Party in its claims to sovereign rights or jurisdiction in
its claimed territory, territorial sea, continental shelf, EEZ, or its
rights and responsibilities therein under the 1982 UNCLOS.
4. The Parties undertake to use the sea for peaceful purposes
only. In particular, the Parties concerned undertake to resolve
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friend-
ly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly
concerned, in accordance with universally recognized princi-
ples of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea;
5. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the area pro-
vided for by universally recognized principles of international
law including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
6. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct
of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and
affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining
from occupying presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals,
cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a
constructive manner;
7. Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional
disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to
seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to
build trust and confidence between and among them, including:
• Establishing military hotlines;61
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61. Jung Sung-li, “Seoul Urges Beijing to Honor Pact on Hotlines,” Korea
Times, January 8, 2008; Edward Cody, “China and U.S. to Establish Mili-
• Holding dialogues and exchanging views as appropriate
between their defense and military officials;62
• Notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of
any impending military exercise in waters of interest to
other Parties;
• Ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are
either in danger or in distress;
• Exchanging on a voluntary basis, relevant information.
8. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the dis-
putes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooper-
ative activities including entering into provisional arrange-
ments of a practical nature with respect to:
• Marine environmental protection;
• Marine scientific research;
• Safety of navigation and communication at sea;
• Search and rescue operations;
• Combating of transnational crime, including but not limited
to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at
sea, and illegal traffic in arms.
• Sharing, or joint development of resources, in areas of over-
lapping claims.
The modalities, scope, and locations of bilateral and multilat-
eral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties con-
cerned prior to their actual implementation.
9. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consulta-
tions and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modali-
ties to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on
the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promot-
ing good neighborliness and transparency, establishing har-
mony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating
peaceful resolution of disputes among them;
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tary Hotline,” Washington Post, November 7, 2007; “China, Russia Open
Direct Military Hotline,” Xinhua, March 14, 2008, online at www.china
daily.com.cn/china/2008-03/14/content_6538323.htm; “China, Japan
Preach Consensus on Taiwan Issue Defense Co-op,” Xinhua, March 31,
2008, online at www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-03/31cpmtemt_
6579779.htm.
62. Christopher Bodeen, “US, China Navies Discuss Joint Drill,” Associated
Press, February 27, 2008, online at http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/2008
0227/us-china-navies-discuss-joint-drills.htm.
10. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Decla-
ration and take actions consistent therewith;
11. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles
contained in this Declaration;
12. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of
conduct in Northeast Asian waters would further promote
peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the
basis of consensus, toward the eventual attainment of this
objective;
13. The Parties concerned agree to consider incorporating the pre-
vious provisions into a formal code of conduct and to consider
incorporating the following provisions as well:
• Creation of a Maritime Nuclear Weapon Free Zone63
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63. These provisions are drawn or modified from the “Treaty on the South-
east Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)” (1995), online at
www.aseansec.org/2082.htm; Definitions:
a. “nuclear weapon” means any explosive device capable of releasing
nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner but does not include the
means of transport or delivery of such device if separable from and
not an indivisible part thereof;
b. “station” means to deploy, emplace, implant, install, stockpile or
store;
c. “radioactive material” means material that contains radionuclides
above clearance or exemption levels recommended by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
d. “radioactive wastes” means material that contains or is contaminat-
ed with radionuclides at concentrations or activities greater than
clearance levels recommended by the IAEA and for which no use is
foreseen; and
e. “dumping” means;
i. any deliberate disposal at sea, including seabed and subsoil inser-
tion, of radioactive wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea; and
ii. any deliberate disposal at sea, including seabed and subsoil inser-
tion of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at
sea, containing radioactive material, but does not include the dis-
posal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the
normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-
made structures at sea and their equipment other than wastes or
other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or
other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of 
– The “zone” means the internal waters, territorial seas con-
tinental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the Par-
ties and the seabed, and the subsoil thereof and the air-
space above them.
– Each Party undertakes not to anywhere inside the zone
develop, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store,
deploy, station, test or use nuclear weapons or to allow
any other state to do so in its portion of the zone.
– Each Party also undertakes not to dump or discharge in
the zone any radioactive material or wastes or allow any
other state to do so.
– Nothing in this Declaration shall prejudice the right of Par-
ties to use nuclear energy and material within the zone for
peaceful purposes.
– Each State Party, on being notified, may decide for itself
whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its
ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft,
and navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea
or archipelagic waters and overflight of foreign aircraft
above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights
of innocent passage, or transit passage.
• Guidelines64 for Navigation and Overflight of the Exclusive
Economic Zone,65
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disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such
wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or
structures.
Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, January
20, 1992, online at www.Fas.org/news/skorea/1992/appendix17.htm.
64. These “Guidelines” are selectively drawn from EEZ Group 21, Guidelines
for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone A Commentary
(Tokyo: Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 2006); and the “Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on the Prevention of
Incidents On and Over the High Seas,” May 25, 1972 and its “Protocol”
of May 22, 1973. See the first reference for the explanation and the ratio-
nale for each guideline.
65. Definitions of terms used in the Guidelines:
For the purposes of these Guidelines:
1. “abuse of rights” means the unnecessary or arbitrary exercise of
rights, jurisdiction and freedoms, or interference with the exercise of
rights by another State, or the abuse or misuse of powers by a State
causing injury to another State;
I. Rights and duties of the coastal State
1. A State using another State’s EEZ should ensure that its ves-
sels and aircraft with sovereign immunity act, as far as is rea-
sonable and practicable, in a manner consistent with the 1982
UNCLOS.
2. Any restriction on navigation and overflight imposed by a
coastal State in its EEZ due to its weapons tests and exercises,
or any other operational activity, should be temporary, in
specified areas only, and only if such suspension is essential
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2. “exclusive economic zone” means an area referred to as such in rel-
evant Articles of the 1982 UNCLOS;
3. “hydrographic survey” means a survey having for its principal pur-
pose the determination of data relating to bodies of water. A hydro-
graphic survey may consist of the determination of one or several of
the following classes of data: depth of water, configuration and
nature of the seabed; directions and force of currents; heights and
times of tides and water stages; and location of topographic features
and fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes;
4. “marine environment” is the physical, chemical, geological and bio-
logical components, conditions and factors which interact and
determine the productivity, state, condition and quality of the
marine ecosystem, the waters of the seas and the oceans and the air
immediately above those waters, as well as the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof;
5. “marine scientific research” means activities undertaken in the
marine environment to enhance scientific knowledge regarding the
nature and natural processes of the seas and oceans, the seabed and
subsoil;
6. “military activities” means the operations of military vessels, air-
craft and devices, including intelligence gathering, exercises, trials,
training, and weapons practices;
7. “military surveys” refers to activities undertaken in the marine
environment involving data collection for military purposes;
8. “peaceful uses/purposes” in the context of the EEZ means that uses
of that zone, or the purposes of activities conducted therein or there
above, must not threaten or use force;
9. “surveillance” means the observation by visual or any technical
means of activities on, over or under the seas and oceans; and
10. “threat of force” means a coercive attempt to compel another State
to take or not to take certain specific action, or an action that is
directed against or undermines the territorial integrity or political
independence of that State, or against any of its assets or people, or
taken in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.
for the carrying out of such tests and exercises.
II. Rights and duties of other states
1. While exercising the freedoms of navigation and overflight in
a coastal State’s EEZ, States should avoid activities that unrea-
sonably prejudice the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal State.
III. Maritime surveillance
1. Maritime surveillance may be conducted by States for peace-
ful purposes in areas claimed by other States as EEZ. This sur-
veillance should not prejudice the jurisdictional rights and
responsibilities of the coastal State within its EEZ.
IV. Military activities
1. With the exception of the qualifications noted elsewhere in
these guidelines, military vessels and aircraft have the right to
navigate in, or fly over, the EEZs of other States, and to engage
in other internationally lawful uses of the sea associated with
the operations of ships and aircraft.
2. Ships and aircraft of a State undertaking military activities in
the EEZ of another State have the obligation to use the ocean
for peaceful purposes only, and to refrain from the threat or
use of force, or provocative acts, such as stimulating or exciting
the defensive systems of the coastal State; collecting informa-
tion to support the use of force against the coastal State; or
establishing a “sea base” within another State’s EEZ without
its consent. The user State should have due regard for the
rights of others, including the coastal State, to use the sea and
comply with its obligation under international law; such activi-
ties should follow the “Rules of the Road.”
3. Warships or aircraft of a State intending to carry out a major mili-
tary exercise in the EEZ of another State should inform the
coastal State and others through a timely navigational warning of
the time, date, and areas involved in the exercise, and if possible,
invite observers from the coastal State to witness the exercise.
4. Military activities in the EEZ of other States should not ham-
per the search and rescue operations of the coastal State in its
EEZ. States should cooperate in any such search and rescue
operations.
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5. Military activities by a State in the EEZ of another State should
not involve the deployment of systems that prejudice the
defense or security of the coastal State, or interfere with or
endanger the right of the coastal State to protect and manage
its resources and environment.
6. Military activities of a State in the EEZs of other States should
not cause pollution or negatively affect the marine environment
or marine living resources including mammals. In particular, if
prohibited by the laws of the coastal State, such activities in a
coastal State’s EEZ should not involve live weapons fire, under-
water explosions, or creation of sound waves and dangerous or
radioactive materials that may directly or indirectly harm
marine life or cause marine pollution.
7. Military activities by another State should not be conducted:
• In areas which have been announced by the coastal State as
temporarily closed for the purposes of safety of navigation
and overflight;
• In areas with intensive fishing activities declared by the
coastal State;
• In areas with special circumstances adopted in accordance
with Article 211 (6)(a) of the 1982 UNCLOS;
• In marine parks or marine protected areas declared by the
coastal State as required by Article 194 (5) of the 1982 UNC-
LOS;
• In areas with intensive navigation and near sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes; and
• Near submarine cables and pipelines on the seabed of the
EEZ clearly marked by the coastal State on large-scale charts
recognized by the coastal State.
8. If there are high seas immediately adjacent to the coastal
State’s EEZ, a State undertaking military exercises should
make every possible effort to limit them to the high seas.
9. Ships and aircraft of the user State shall not make simulated
attacks on ships of the coastal State, nor launch nor drop any
objects near ships of the coastal State.
V. Non-interference with electronic systems
1. The activities of another State in the EEZ of a coastal State
should not interfere with the communications, computer, and
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electronic systems of the coastal State, or make broadcasts that
adversely affect the defense or security of the coastal State.
2. The coastal State should not interfere with the communica-
tions, computer, and electronic systems of vessels or aircraft of
another State exercising its freedoms of navigation or over-
flight in or over the coastal State’s EEZ.
3. In order to make subparagraphs a and b effective, States
should conclude agreements regarding mutual non-interfer-
ence with communications, computer, and electronic systems.
VI. Suppression of piracy and other unlawful activities
1. Ships in an EEZ are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
their flag State, except in circumstances provided by the 1982
UNCLOS or other international treaties.
2. States may act in an EEZ of another State to seize a pirate ship
or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the proper-
ty onboard.
3. To suppress terrorism and illicit traffic in drugs, persons,
arms, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems and related materials, States should:
• Board and search any vessel flying their flag in their EEZ
that is reasonably suspected of transporting terrorists or
being engaged in illicit traffic in drugs, persons, arms and
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, and seize
such cargoes that are identified as such; and
• Consent, under appropriate circumstances, to the boarding
and search of their own flag vessels by other States, and to
the seizure of terrorists or drugs, persons, arms, and WMD-
related cargoes on such vessels that may be mutually identi-
fied as such by both States;
4. The boarding and search of a foreign flag vessel in an EEZ
without the consent of the flag State is not justified solely
because it is suspected of illegal trafficking in WMD, their
delivery systems, or related materials.
5. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels in the EEZ of
a coastal State, the arresting vessel should through appropri-
ate channels inform the coastal State of the action taken.
A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia      177
VII. Marine scientific research
1. Coastal State consent should in normal circumstances be
granted for marine scientific research in its EEZ exclusively
for peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific
knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all
humanity.
2. Marine scientific research in a coastal State’s EEZ that has
direct use for living and non-living resource exploration and
exploitation, conservation and management is entirely under
the jurisdiction of the coastal State, which is not obliged to
grant consent to such research by foreign vessels.
3. Overflight by manned or unmanned aircraft or spacecraft of
one State over the EEZ of another State should not be conduct-
ed for the purpose of marine scientific research without the
consent of the coastal State.
VIII. Hydrographic surveying
1. Hydrographic surveying should only be conducted in the EEZ
of another State with the consent of the coastal State. This
does not apply to the collection of navigational data by a ship
required for safe navigation during the ship’s passage through
an EEZ.
2. The Guidelines in Articles VII and VIII also apply to aircraft,
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), remotely operated
vehicles (ROVs), and other remotely operated devices of a
State conducting research or collecting data in an EEZ.
IX. Transparency of legislation
1. Those States with policies and/or legislation regarding mili-
tary activities in their EEZs should make them as transparent
and as widely known as possible, including to the military
authorities of other States that are frequently using or navigat-
ing their EEZs.
The Importance of Multilateral Regimes
Some elements of the “code” might initially be bilateral and
evolve from a web of bilateral arrangements into multilateral
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regimes. This trend is already evident in the fisheries and envi-
ronmental protection sectors. However, multilateral regimes
reduce transaction costs, and establish and strengthen regional
identity and the regime itself. For issues such as fisheries man-
agement, environmental protection, and scientific research, mul-
tilateral regimes are necessary for their effectiveness.
Initially, any formal multilateral arrangement should address
common maritime problems such as search and rescue, environ-
mental protection, drug trafficking, and smuggling of arms and
humans. Further out to sea, in time and space, a Northeast Asian
ocean peacekeeping force might ensure safety and security of
navigation, undertake air-sea rescue, protect fisheries from illegal
fishers, and the environment from pollution and potential pol-
luters. The harder issues—comprehensive fisheries manage-
ment, and ultimately, common security—would be next.
Such a trend, however, would have to overlie and be affect-
ed by the larger security dilemma—a preexisting pattern of sus-
picion and distrust based on fundamental political and ideologi-
cal differences that extend like sensitive tentacles into the mar-
itime sphere where these nations literally come face to face. And
this fundamental fact is why the maritime frontier in Northeast
Asia is a natural and perhaps even a necessary starting point for
building confidence and common security.
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